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As part of a highly critical discussion of much recent work in linguistics, Paul 
Postal identifies “the most irresponsible passage written by a professional linguist 
in the entire history of linguistics” (Postal 2004: 296).1 The brief of the present 
piece is to correct an error in Postal’s reasoning. Space precludes a discussion of 
Postal’s broader assault against what he perceives to be ‘junk linguistics’, 
although some brief remarks will be offered that pertain to the essence of his 
criticism.2 The “most irresponsible passage” is from Noam Chomsky and includes 
the following remarks:  
[Expressions, i.e. the output of the language faculty — JC] are not entities 
with some ontological status; they are introduced to simplify talk about 
properties of [the language faculty — JC], and they can be eliminated in 
favor of internalist notions. One of the properties of Peano’s axioms PA is 
that PA generates the proof P of “2 + 2 = 4” but not the proof P’ of “2 + 2 = 
7” (in suitable notation). We can speak freely of the property “generable by 
PA”, holding of P but not P’, and derivatively of lines of generable proofs 
(theorems) and the set of theorems without postulating any entities beyond 
PA and its properties.           (Chomsky 2001: 41f.)  
Chomsky’s general point in this passage, I take it, is that the empirical coverage 
of any theoretical discourse can be rendered as a commitment to a set of the 
relevant entities (e.g., the set of possible trajectories of Halley’s Comet, the set of 
possible electrons, the set of possible tigers, or, indeed, the set of expressions as 
the idealized output of the language faculty). Such ontological commitment to 
the sets of the relevant entities, however, is not required for the explanatory goals 
of the given sciences, unless, of course, the science is a branch of mathematics 
that is concerned with large sets and their properties, and there the identity of the 
entities is irrelevant. In linguistics, at least, “[n]o ‘Platonism’ is introduced, and 
no ‘E-linguistic’ notions: only biological entities and their properties” (Chomsky 
2001: 42). 
 Now, of course, no scientific theory is merely concerned with what finitely 
happens to obtain; for example, zoology is concerned with tigerhood, as it were, 
                                                
   My thanks go to David Miller, for numerous helpful remarks, and to Paul Postal, for alert-
ing me to certain infelicities and misinterpretations in earlier drafts. 
    1 For, to my mind, a sound review of Postal’s more general remarks against ‘junk linguistics’, 
see Boeckx (2006). 
    2 For wider discussion of the same themes, see Collins (forthcoming). 
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not its contingent instantiation. Every theory, we may say, has an infinite import. 
This is because the very notion of explanation is modal insofar as it must support 
counterfactuals. Thus, a law does not describe phenomena but tells us what will 
occur under any conditions that satisfy the properties the theory posits. For 
example, Newton’s laws don’t purport to describe our solar system (unlike 
Kepler’s ‘laws’), but instead tell us what will occur in any circumstances that are 
covered by the concepts of classical mass and force, which our solar system 
happens to realize (within certain parameters — forget about twentieth century 
developments). In this sense, Newton’s laws tell us about infinitely many 
possible systems, even though our universe is finite (we presume).3 The same 
holds in the case of linguistics. A formal theory tells us about infinitely many 
possible states the human mind/brain can fall into, without committing itself to 
the idea that the mind/brain is infinite, or, of course, that there are infinitely 
many sentences anywhere at all, not even in Plato’s heaven. To be sure, we need 
to employ the notion of an infinity of expressions, in Chomsky’s sense, much as 
we are required to think about infinitely many states of any physical system 
(theorized, say, in terms of Lagrangians or Hamiltonians). My present point is 
merely that such notions, while essential in the modal sense explained above, 
don’t attract our ontological commitment, at least not if we are working within 
the theory (cf. Feferman’s 1998 position on the relation between science and 
mathematics).4 If all this is so, linguistics looks to be in the same boat as any other 
science. Let us now turn to the detail of Chomsky’s remarks quoted above, which 
Postal finds so objectionable.  
 Postal thinks Chomsky’s reasoning is particularly irresponsible because 
Chomsky distorts the mathematical case (PA, a formalized theory of elementary 
arithmetic) to lend weight to his ontological claims about linguistics. The average 
linguist, we may presume, is not familiar with the relevant mathematics and so is 
liable to be taken in by Chomsky’s conceit.  
 Postal reads Chomsky as suggesting that the standard metatheoretic results 
for a theory of elementary arithmetic (PA) do not require the postulation of a set 
of truths. Such a suggestion, however, apparently contradicts Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems; indeed, the results would not even be formulatable: 
“[To show that] a system like PA is complete, one must consider the relation 
between two sets […] the set of theorems of [PA] and the set of truths about [the 
natural numbers]”, both infinite (Postal 2004: 303). So, if Chomsky’s remarks are 
correct “not only would it be impossible to prove Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems, it would be impossible to even formulate them” (Postal 2004: 303). 
Postal’s reasoning is awry. 
 First, Postal appears to have been misled by the familiar informal 
                                                
    3 I don’t presume that ‘laws’ necessarily determine everything that happens to occur, for 
many events or states might fall outside of the scope of the concepts that enter into general 
laws. For example, presumably, no law of physics will tell us the number of the inner 
planets. See van Fraassen (1989) for, to my mind, an excellent discussion of these issues. 
    4 Controversy on this issue appears to arise from the common talk in linguistics and 
philosophy of natural languages being infinite. The infinity of English, as it might be, 
however, is not a phenomenon. The phenomenon is that particular organisms are 
continuously novel in their speech and understanding, which we theorize in terms of 
unbounded generation.  
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presentation of Gödel’s (first) incompleteness theorem as showing that there are 
unprovable truths of PA. There is, I should say, nothing wrong with such a 
characterization just so long as one does not take it to reflect the actual mechanics 
of Gödel’s proof (there are many ways of presenting Gödel’s theorems; here we 
are concerned with Postal’s claims about what is essential to them). Gödel set 
himself the task of showing that finitary PA is incomplete on its own terms, i.e., 
without making any non-finitary assumptions, such as the set of every PA truth, 
for such a set is inadmissible in finitary metamathematics. Gödel’s result is 
wholly syntactic/combinatorial and so finitary in the sense that it can be carried 
out within PA itself.5 Gödel wrote: 
 
The method of proof […] can be applied to any formal system that, first, 
when interpreted as representing a system of notions and propositions, has 
at its disposal sufficient means of expression to define [such] notions […] 
and in which, second, every provable formula is true in the interpretation 
considered. The purpose of carrying out […] the proof with full precision in 
what follows is, among other things, to replace the second of the 
assumptions just mentioned by a purely formal and much weaker one. 
(Gödel 1931/1986: 151; cf. p.181) 
 
 As mentioned above, Gödel adopts this weaker formulation in order to be 
consistent with Hilbert’s finitary scruples on metamathematics. The weaker 
formulation substitutes formal (syntactic/combinatorial) consistency principles 
— ‘simple consistency’ and ‘ω-consistency’ — for ‘truth’. This syntactic character 
of the result became clearer still with Rosser’s later technique of generating 
undecidable formulae without appeal to ω-consistency.     
 So, Postal’s claim that the relevant theorems are unformulatable without 
the positing of a set of truths is false; the opposite is the case, at least if the 
theorem is not to be question begging against finitary metamathematics of the 
kind that concerned Gödel.6  
 Secondly, the general notions of completeness and incompleteness do not 
require the postulation of two sets; both notions can be construed in finitary 
proof-theoretic terms, which are the notions Gödel employed. Gödel’s proof 
proceeds by a lemma that allows for the construction of PA formulae that are 
such that, if PA is consistent, then neither the formulae nor their negations are 
theorems of PA (‘simple consistency’ also needs no postulation of a set of truths; 
PA is consistent if and only if there is at least one PA formula that is not a PA 
theorem). The incompleteness of PA follows, on the assumption that it is 
consistent (the ‘undecidable’ formulae become theorems in a system richer than 
                                                
    5 The so-called ‘Hilbert Program’ was dedicated to establishing finitary consistency proofs for 
classical mathematics (arithmetic, analysis, etc.), proofs that, inter alia, make no essential 
appeal to ‘actual infinities’ by way of, for example, unrestricted use of excluded middle or 
negations of universal quantifications. There are currently many different ways of 
construing finitary scruples. Postal (2004: 301) accuses of Chomsky of “distortion” for 
conflating the axioms of PA with a proof theory. It is perfectly standard, however, to use 
‘PA’ to designate a first-order formalization of the axioms along with a given proof theory, 
as Chomsky makes clear in his talk of “suitable notation”.  
    6 It is worth noting that Gödel’s completeness proof for first-order logic does require the 
postulation of a set of truths in that the proof shows that there is no first-order satisfiable 
formula that is not a theorem.  
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PA, which is what the theorem amounts to, in one sense). So, one can prove 
Gödel’s theorem, as Gödel himself did, without the postulation of a set of truths.7 
 Postal is correct to think that Gödel refuted the ambitions of strict finitary 
proof theory as laid out by Hilbert, but Chomsky does not even hint at the 
contrary.8 Chomsky’s point is almost banal. One can, by familiar techniques, 
codify first-order PA as a Turing machine program (in fact, the main business of 
Gödel’s 1931 paper was to show that the relevant metamathematical concepts are 
all decidable apart from ‘provable’, which is only semi-decidable). The program 
is a finite object that has an infinite output. One is not thereby committed to the 
output being a set in Plato’s heaven anymore than an astronomer is committed to 
the infinite set of the trajectories of Halley’s Comet. In formal proof theory, one 
thinks of a proof as a (finite) set of formulae drawn from the relevant formal 
language. Whether a formula is a theorem (“2 + 2 = 4”) or not (“2 + 2 = 7”) is 
determined by the axioms and rules of inference of the theory (the properties of 
the ‘finite object’). Imagine coming a across a machine, like Paley and his watch, 
that spews out arithmetical formulae. One can investigate the ‘program’ of the 
machine as a finite object realized in the physical structure of the machine. One 
may, for instance, wonder whether there is a formula compatible with the 
‘program’ (well-formed), which is such that neither it nor its negation will be 
produced. Such an approach towards the machine does not involve “postulating 
any entities beyond [the program] and its properties”. Of course, Gödel showed 
that any formal system of sufficient richness (capable of representing arithmetic) 
will express undecidable propositions, but this result does not flow from looking 
beyond the finite system (incompleteness follows from finitary reasoning, which 
was Gödel’s point), nor does it show that any particular metaphysics of 
mathematics is correct.9 Likewise, linguistics may freely posit a finite object 
realized in the human mind/brain and theorize over its derivations and sets of 
expressions without thereby committing itself to any entities beyond the biology 
of the mind/brain. If there are such entities, then they have to be established, 
much as, mutatis mutandis, Gödel established the limitations of certain 
formalizations, but the mere availability of a set theoretical formulation does not 
take one beyond whatever entities are one’s primary concern. 
 Postal raises serious issues about the interpretation of formalism vis-à-vis 
phenomena, or, equivalently, the status of abstractions in science. My brief has 
been to argue that no quandaries over this issue selectively strike at work in 
linguistics; more specifically, the status and interpretation of Gödel’s results have 
                                                
    7 Via techniques introduced by Tarski, one can define a truth predicate for the language of PA 
in a richer metalanguage, where the undecidable formulae generable in PA are rendered as 
theorems, i.e. true. It is in this sense that the (first) incompleteness theorem shows that there 
are unprovable truths of PA (keeping to the resources of PA itself). The class of second-
order PA truths, however, remains undecidable.  
    8  One can be finitary, however, without being Hilbertian. Kleene (1986: 138) notes: “Gödel’s 
second incompleteness theorem, rather than ending efforts at finding finitary consistency 
proofs, pointed out the road to success”. That is, Gödel showed that certain elementary 
procedures were inadequate. 
    9 Gödel was a Platonist by inclination, but he did not take his incompleteness results to 
establish the truth of Platonism; indeed, he was also sympathetic to Leibniz and Kant on the 
philosophy of mathematics. See Gödel (1961/1995). 
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no particular bearing on linguistics. Postal’s remarks are certainly not the most 
irresponsible in the history of linguistics; equally, to say the least, they go no way 
to show that Chomsky’s remarks are either. 
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